Killing Patton: The Strange Death of World War II’s Most Audacious General


Killing Patton: The Strange Death of World War II’s Most Audacious General
Bill O’Reilly and Martin Dugard. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2014.
As reviewed by Ted Odenwald

killingpattonGeneral George Patton, one of our most productive military leaders in World War II, was seriously injured in an alleged accident, in which an army 2 1/2 –ton truck crashed head-on into the General’s limousine in December of 1945 near Bad Nauheim, Germany. The collision itself seemed strange because the truck had suddenly swerved into the path of Patton’s vehicle. Immediately following the crash, the General felt a sharp pain in the back of his neck, and subsequently realized that he was paralyzed from the neck down. Transported to a nearby small military hospital, Patton seemed to have stabilized, though still paralyzed. But in a few days, he became unresponsive, and eventually died.

While O’Reilly and Dugard do no cry “conspiracy,” they believe that there are a number of issues that have since surfaced that demand further investigation. Patton’s limo driver claimed that the actions of the truck driver were totally inexplicable, including that driver’s failure to brake after the impact. The truck driver, Robert Thompson, whisked out of Germany by army intelligence, only to return mysteriously in four days, claimed that he had ridden alone; but Patton’s driver, PFC Horace Woodring, swore that there were two passengers in the truck, both of whom disappeared quickly after the “accident.” The Army apparently reported the event as if it had been a mere fender-bender; the paperwork for subsequent investigations was lost. In 1979, a former OSS (an early form of the CIA) agent claimed that he had part of a hit team that planned the collision; he claimed to have fired a “low-velocity projectile” into Patton’s neck in order to snap it. He further claimed that when the General had failed to succumb to his injuries, agents for the NKVD (prototype for the KGB) poisoned him. Interestingly, the Russians were known to be developing and using several forms of undetectable poisons at that time.

The authors support their suspicions by claiming that Patton was on at least two “hit lists,” that of Stalin and that of American OSS leader, “Wild-Bill” Donovan. Patton’s hatred towards the Russians was never in doubt; he never trusted them, and was sure that they were going to take over much of Europe as soon as Germany was defeated. He angered most allies by claiming that he trusted Germans more than he trusted the Russians—that the Germans, even the most feared of their warriors, should be allowed to rebuild their own country, rather than being saddled with paying reparations to other damaged countries. He greatly admired the magnificent training and preparedness of the Germans, considering them to be worthy opponents; he viewed the Russians as a barbaric horde.

The majority of this study is a build-up to the questions of conspiracy/accident/ assassination. Focusing on the last year of the war in Europe, the authors emphasize the frustration of Patton, whose Third Army had been relegated to relatively insignificant duties. Allied commander, General Dwight Eisenhower , had entrusted British Field Marshall Montgomery with the major thrust into Germany. Supplies had been diverted from Patton to Montgomery, leaving the American little room to maneuver. He attempted a futile assault on Fort Driant near Metz, only to realize that his attack would not work.

A major German counterattack that became known as The Battle of the Bulge put allied forces at risk of annihilation. Patton’s Third Army, well supplied, rushed to the rescue of American forces at Bastogne, earning him honors as the hero of that great battle. But almost immediately, he was “sentenced” to a position subordinate to that of his “rival,” Montgomery. Having suffered many slights and setbacks, “many of his own doing,” Patton directed his army across the Rhine River into southern Germany while Montgomery was still planning his actions to the north. While his victories were much appreciated, Patton’s off-the–cuff, ill-chosen remarks made him fall deeper and deeper in Eisenhower’s estimation. Finally, as victory in Germany was achieved, Patton hoped for assignment to the Pacific, where he could continue to fight. But anticipating massive ego clashes between Patton and MacArthur, Army Chief of Staff, George Marshall, realized that Patton would have to end his career in Europe. Eisenhower relieved Patton of command of his beloved Third Army, making his most successful general head a paper pusher, at the head of the Fifteenth Army, and governing  Bavaria.

Some things were certain about Patton. He was among the most arrogant and abrasive of our leaders. He was volatile and impolitic in his disapproval of his superiors and his peers. He had a virulent suspicion and hatred of the Russians, a hatred that nearly led to the severance of communications among the allies. But his predictions about the Russian goals of taking over all of Eastern Europe were right-on, and almost unanimously ignored until it was too late. There were many reasons why allied leaders might have wanted to eliminate Patton; O’Reilly and Dugard have presented a good argument for reopening an apparently closed case.

tedTed Odenwald and his wife, Shirley have lived in Oakland for 44 years. He taught HS English at Glen Rock High School for all of those years plus one more. Now he is enjoying time spent with his family, singing in the North Jersey Chorus and quenching his wanderlust. Ted is also the Worship Leader at the Ramapo Valley Baptist Church in Oakland.