Dan Fagin. Toms River: A Story of Science and Salvation.
New York: Bantam Books, 2013.
As reviewed by Ted Odenwald
Dan Fagin, a science and environmental journalist, believes that Toms River, NJ (a.k.a. Dover Township) is the site of a preventable manmade catastrophe caused by the combination of corporate greed, governmental indifference, and public obliviousness. He exhaustively details the history of two chemical corporations (Ciba’s “Toms River Chemical” and Union Carbide), who dumped massive amounts of toxic waste that wound up in the river, the Atlantic Ocean, and the drinking water of tens of thousands of citizens. The United Water Company of Toms River shared in the responsibility by failing to adequately filter out known pollutants and failing to warn consumers of potential dangers. The salvation of which Fagin speaks is the result of Herculean efforts by scientists to identify these pollutants and to prove that these pollutants had in fact adversely affected the population, particularly with regard to incidences of cancer.
Ciba’s arrival in New Jersey in 1952 was welcomed because its “mini city,” sequestered in the dense pine forests, brought thousands of jobs to a sleepy economy. What the residents did not know was the sad history of toxic pollution caused by this company when it was in Cincinnati. In its primary operation, synthetic dye-making, the company generated more waste than actual product: one pound of dye to five and one half pounds of hazardous chemical waste. Solid waste came in three forms: “filter cakes” — grainy material soaked with solvents, captured by filters; “still bottoms”– the gummy layers of solids that formed at the bottoms of kettles; and “clarification residues” — chunks of chemicals floating in liquid dye. These solids were either placed in drums or dumped into pits on the company grounds. Liquid waste was mixed with water (one part waste to two hundred parts water) and dumped into unlined “holding lakes,” which lay in sandy absorbent soil.
When it was discovered that the dumping was affecting the health of the river, Ciba built a pipeline that carried waste water one-half mile into the Atlantic Ocean near Ortley Beach. It wasn’t until the waste ate holes in the metal piping that New Jersey residents realize they were dealing with a serious problem, worsened by the fact that Ciba was being paid to dispose of the waste of other companies.
Union Carbide had hired a contractor to dispose of its waste drums; unfortunately, the hauler/contractor appeared to be either ignorant or unscrupulous, for after bargaining for the use of a chicken farm, he buried, crushed, or dumped thousands of drums of toxic waste. The effluvia sank into the soil, threatening many local wells; the plume of waste actually seeped into the aquifer, affecting two of the water company’s twenty wells.
Throughout this study, Fagin interjects passages about how scientists over the centuries have come to understand epidemics. Again and again, he shows how researchers used the background and technology available to them to focus upon probable causes. Beginning with 16th –century Swiss physician, Paracelsus, the “new science” focused on illnesses through observation and experimentation. Fagin gives brief accounts of the heroic efforts of several great people of science: Pierre Louis discredited bloodletting as a cure and examined disease clusters; William Farr looked for patterns of communicable disease epidemics; John Snow conducted detailed interviews of families afflicted by cholera in order to determine the likely location of polluted water sources; Ramazzini inspected work sites to determine causes of workers’ illnesses; and Walther Hesse sought the cause of miners’ disease by measuring environmental conditions within the mineshafts.
Fagin cites these pioneers of medicine to show that it was their methodologies that were employed to bring “salvation: to Toms River. For, as one might expect, clusters of illnesses, particularly cancers, began appearing in the township. What was needed was for scientists to take “…the tools of infectious disease epidemiology—case counts, geographic temporal patterns, interviews, environmental measurements, physical examinations—and [apply them]…rigorously to cancer.” While the cause-and-effect would seem to be self-evident, victims, their families, and even scientists were frustrated by strong resistance. The state government was slow to act strongly because of the enormous cost of these studies—and because it seemed impossible to determine exactly what materials and how much had been dumped and had actually seeped into the water supply. Inspections were conducted and fines assessed, but these were mere slaps-on-the- wrist, as the chemical companies continued dumping. The township itself, which should have been terrified that its wells had been polluted, was angered because of the notoriety it was receiving; bad press would lead to lowered property values.
Finally, some solid and damning information came out—facts that did not present the entire picture, but did provide strong intimations of the extent of damage done: the Ciba factories’ files on workers revealed a significant number of brain cancer cases, high rates of cancer among men working with azo dyes and plastics and resins, and high risks in laboratory and maintenance workers.
In 1992, Michael Berry conducted the first comprehensive analysis of cancer in Toms River and found that the rate of brain and nervous system cancers was seven times the expected rate—in fact, every category of childhood cancer was higher than the expected rate. But these findings were not released because of the relatively small size of the examined group.
Eventually families of victims “received an indirect acknowledgment from Ciba, Dow (Union Carbide), and United Water that their children had been harmed.” There was no admission, no apology, or explanation, “…just a dollar sign….” studies concluded that children exposed prenatally were at high risk as were children under the age of five who were exposed to airborne emissions.
The poisoning of the land, water, and air had gone on for decades. The exact number and quantity of pollutants will never be determined. But the diligent work of dedicated scientists and committed parents led to conclusions that caused Toms River to be recognized in the class of American environmental horror stories with the Love Canal and Woburn, Massachusetts.
Ted Odenwald and his wife, Shirley have lived in Oakland for 43 years. He taught HS English at Glen Rock High School for all of those years plus one more. Now he is enjoying time spent with his family, singing in the North Jersey Chorus and quenching his wanderlust. Ted is also the Worship Leader at the Ramapo Valley Baptist Church in Oakland.